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French: Torts--Last Clear Chance Doctrine

STUDENT NOTES AND RECENT ,CASES
TORTS-LAST CkiAR CANcE DocmnqE.-One of the syllabus
points of the recent West Virginia case, McLeod v. Oharleston
Laundry Company,'- lays down a very broad interpretation of
the last clear chance doctrine. The rule as expounded by the
Supreme Court of Appeals, however, was merely dictum; but it
raised an interesting question of how far our court is apparently
willing to go in its application of this doctrine.
Mrs. MeLeod, in a blinding rainstorm, with her umbrella pulled
down over her head so as to obstruct her view, ran out into the
street and was struck by the defendant's truck. Evidence tended
to show that the driver was within eight or ten feet of her
when he first saw her, and that he pulled on his emergency and
swerved to the side but could not avoid the collision. The court
very properly held that the doctrine of last chance did not apply,
and that Mrs. McLeod's contributory negligence would bar a
recovery.

It went further, however, and laid down the very broad rule
as follows: "The doctrine of last clear chance is a qualification
of the general rule that contributory negligence bars a recovery,
and the principle of the doctrine is that, although the plaintiff
has been negligent in exposing himself to peril, and although his
negligence may have continued until the accident happened, he
may nevertheless recover if the defendant, after knowing of
plaintiff's danger, or by the exercise of ordinary care could have
known, and having reason to suppose that he may not save himself, could have avoided the injury by the exercise of ordinary
care, and failed to do so."
The courts of our different states are clearly not in accord in
their interpretations of the doctrine of last chance. A few refuse to follow it at all; while others restrict it within varying
limits. Some, and among them is apparently our own court, are
very liberal in their applications of the rule.
The doctrine is generally stated that where the plaintiff
through his own negligence has placed himself in a perilous situacould
tion, and the defendant by the exercise of ordinary care
so, the plaintiff may
have avoided the accident but failed to do
2
recover in spite of his original negligence.
the
The reason for the rule is generally given to be that since
have,
not
did
defendant had an opportunity, which the plaintiff
1106 W. Va. 361, 145 S. E. 756 (1928).
539.

245 0. J.
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to avoid the injury by the exercise of due care, his negligence
is regarded as the proximate cause of the injury, being subsequent
to that of the plaintiff, and he is therefore liable.
The rule would logically have no application where the negligence of both parties was concurrent. There must have been
some negligent act of the defendant, subsequent to that of the
plaintiff to invoke the doctrine.'
In considering only a few of the fact situations in which the
question of last chance has arisen in West Virginia, we can see a
very liberal tendency on the part of the court.
The dictum in McLeod v. Laundry Company, supra, gives rise
to the question of whether actual knowledge of the plaintiff's
peril is necessary to impose liability on the defendant. This
question may arise in two different situations: first, where the
plaintiff's negligence has ceased, or he can not extricate himself
from his dangerous position; and second, where the plaintiff's
negligence is still active at the time of the accident, or he can save
himself but fails to do so. Considering these facts we find four
classes of cases:
different
First, where
the plaintiff's negligence has terminated; the defendant is aware of the plaintiff's peril, and has an opportunity
to avoid the injury by exercising due care, but fails to do so.
This a clear case for the application of the doctrine, and the
courts are practically unanimous in allowing a recovery here.'
Second, where the plaintiff's negligence has terminated; the
defendant is not aware of the plaintiff's peril, but by the exercise
of due care he could have discovered it in time to have averted
the accident, and fails to do so.
A large number of our courts hold that there is no liability
unless the defendant has actual knowledge of the plaintiff's
peril.( The theory of these courts is that if the defendant was
never actually aware of the danger, there was never a time when
he had an opportunity to avoid the accident which was not
845

C.

J. 540.

4 Shanks v. Traction Co., 101 Mo. App. 702, 74 S. W. 396 (1903).
5Jeffries v. Asheraft, 104 W. Va. 636, 141 S. E. 14 (1928); Deputy v.
Kimmel, 73 W. Va. 595, 80 S. E. 919 (1914); Carrico v. Ry. Co., 39 W.
Va. 86, 19 S. E. 571 (1894); Johnson v. R. R. Co., 25 W. Va. 570 (1885).
e Hawkins v. Ky. Co., 36 Tex. Civ App. 633, 83 S. W. 52 (1904); Shuck
v. Davis, 110 Okla. 196, 237 Pac. 95 (1925); Malone v. Ry Corp., 72 Cal.
App. 736, 238 Pac. 110 (1925); So. Ry. Co. v. Wahl, 196 Ind. 581, 149 N.
E. 72 (1925); Gahagan v. Boston & M. R. R., 70 N. H. 441, 50 Atl. 146
(1901); Stricklin 'v. Ry. Co., 59 Mlont. 367, 197 Pac. 839 (1921); Emmons
v. So. Pac. Co., 97 Ore. 263, 191 Pac. 333 (1920); Todd v. Ry. Co., 135
Tenn. 92, 185 S. W. 62 (1916).
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available to the plaintiff also. Some of these courts, however,
make a distinction between cases where there was a duty upon
the defendant to keep a look-out and where there was no duty,
allowing a recovery in the former instances even where the defendant was not actually aware of the danger.7 "Where one
owing a duty to maintain a look-out could in the exercise of
ordinary care and vigilance have discovered the perilous situation of the plaintiff in time to have averted the injury, the law
presumes that he saw what he ought to have seen and the actual
discovery is not necessary."'
It hardly seems probable that any court would allow a recovery
unless some duty was owing the plaintiff by the defendant to discover him which was breached. This duty need not be statutory
but may also arise from the particular circumstances of the situation. But if there was no such duty violated by the failure to
discover the plaintiff it would be difficult to see on what ground
a court could impose a liability.
Suppose, for instance, that an adult is walking along the railroad track unaware of approaching train. There is no duty on
the part of the engineer to keep a look-out. If the engineer had
been looking ahead he would have seen the plaintiff in time to
have avoided the injury, but he does not do so, and the plaintiff
is struck. Under such circumstances it could hardly be contended
that the defendant was liable, for he has violated no duty. "The
doctrine of the last clear chance cannot be invoked for the purpose of creating a duty on the part of the defendant to discover
the danger, if that danger was not actually discovered; but, on
the other hand, in the absence of an actual discovery of the
danger, the existence of the duty to discover it is a condition
precedent and an indispensable pre-requisite of the doctrine of
last clear chance."
Although there is a conflict of authority on the question
whether a person is liable in the absence of actual discovery of
the plaintiff's peril, the decided tendency of our courts seems to
be toward allowing a recovery in such cases where the defendant
owes the plaintiff a duty to discover him, and the plaintiff's
negligence has ceased."0
West Virginia does not require actual discovery in such cases.
7 36 L. R. A. N. S. 957; Pickett v. Ry. Co., 117 N. C. 616, 23 S. E. 204

(1895).

8 Richards v. Laundry Co., 55 Utah 409, 186 Pac. 439

(1919).

9 36 L. R. A. N. S. 957, n.
lO.1dem.
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In the case of Reidel v. Traction Company," the court makes
this statement: "If the motorman saw the plaintiff in her
perilous situation, or if he could have seen her by the exercise of
ordinary caution, and could thereafter have avoided the accident
by sounding the alarm, or by checking the speed of the car, and
failed to do so, then his failure to do so was a supervening independent act, or acts, of negligence which were the proximate
cause of the plaintiff's injury."
12
In the case of Buchanan v. Railway Company, where the
evidence tended to show that the defendant's agents could have
discovered the plaintiff's danger by the exercise of due care in
time to have avoided the accident, the question of last chance
was held to have been properly submitted to the jury.
Third. Where the plaintiff's negligence continues to the time
of the accident; the defendant is aware of the danger but fails to
use due care and so avoid the injury.
We might make a distinction here between cases where the
plaintiff was conscious of his danger, and where he was not,
although he had an opportunity to save himself. Where the
plaintiff is conscious of the danger and can save himself, even
though the defendant is also aware of the danger and could have
avoided the injury, this would seem to be a clear case of concurrent negligence, and it is doubtful that 'Any court would allow
a recovery.
But suppose that the plaintiff is not aware of his danger; the
defendant sees him in time to realize the situation and to avoid
the collision but fails to do so. There is a split of authority on
this point. Some courts call this concurrent negligence as in the
preceding case, and refuse a recovery. 13 Others apply the doctrine of last chance. 14 In the case of Bruggeman v. Railroad Company," the court said, "It was enough to call for the application
of that doctrine that the defendant's employees knew of plaintiff's danger in time to have avoided the injury to him in the
exercise of reasonable care, even though he was negligent in putting himself in a place of danger, and continued to be negligent
in not looking out for his own safety."
The West Virginia Court would allow a recovery in such cases.
In the case of Truman v. Wink-o Products Company,'" the de1169 W. Va. 18, 71 S. E. 174 (1911).
12 102 W. Va. 426, 125 S. E. 384 (1926).
13 Nassua Iron & Steel Co. v. Ry. Co., 62 N. H. 159 (1882).
14 Pa. Co. v. Reesor, 183 Ind. 287, 108 N. E. 983 (1915).
1 147 Iowa 187, 123 N. W. 1007 (1909).
1096 W. Va. 256, 122 S. E. 745 (1924).
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fendant was driving a truck and saw the plaintiff approaching
the street at some distance away. Defendant estimated that he
could "get by" since she was walking slowly. Just as he
reached her, however, she quickened her pace and he struck her.
The court allowed a recovery under the doctrine of last chance.
Fourth. Where the plaintiff's negligence continues up to the
time of the accident; defendant is not aware of the plaintiff's
danger, but by the exercise of due care could have discovered it
in time to have avoided the injury and fails to do so.
Missouri has probably gone further than any other state in allowing a recovery in such cases where there is a duty on the
part of the defendant to discover the plaintiff. It would seem in
such cases, however, that the parties at the most, have an equal
opportunity of averting the accident, and the negligence is concurrent. West Virginia in the dictum laid down in McLeod v.
Laundry Company, supra, would seem to allow a recovery. The
rule, however, being dictum, may not be followed to this extent.
By way of summary, then, we find that the West Virginia court
applies the doctrine of last chance; first, where defendant has
knowledge of plaintiff's peril, either when the plaintiff's negligence has terminated or is still active; and second, where the
defendant does not know of the plaintiff's peril but by the exercise of due care could have discovered it in time to have avoided
the accident, when the plaintiff's negligence has ceased; and, according to the dictum in McLeod v. Charleston Laundry Company,
even when the negligence is still active.
HAmm L. FREoH.

TRUSTS-EFFECT OF THE STATUTE OF FRAuDs.-In

a recent

West Virginia case, Carter v. Carter,' the court held that exstate.
press trusts are not subject to the statute of frauds in this
VirWest
in
law
the
is
what
to
as
This again raises the question
of
statute
English
the
of
section
.seventh
the
to
ginia in regard
or
trusts
of
creations
or
declarations
all
that
states
frauds which
proved
be
to
hereditaments
or
tenements
land,
any
in
confidences
in some writing signed by the party, enabled to declare such trust,
2
or by his last will in writing. The eighth section of said statute
be of the like force and effect as
shall
trusts
states that implied
1148 S. E. 378 (W. Va. 1929).
229 Charles 11, 0. 3 (1676).
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